THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN LANDPOWER: DOES FORWARD PRESENCE STILL MATTER? THE CASE OF THE ARMY IN THE PACIFIC

https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1927/thumbnail.jp

Political and Socio-Economic Change: Revolutions and Their Implications for the U.S. Military

Dramatic political, economic, and social changes across both the Greater Middle East and Latin America over the last several years—in some instances revolutionary, in others evolutionary—have had profound implications for global security generally and U.S. security specifically. Policymakers in Washington are hence confronted with the issue of how to respond to the various changes in these disparate regions in order to safeguard U.S. interests, promote Western values, and shape the security environment into the future. Whether and to what degree U.S. policymakers can influence the unfolding changes and shape outcomes remains to be seen. But if Washington is to achieve success in this regard though, it will likely only be possible through the skillful employment of a variety of policymaking tools, including development, diplomacy, and defense. The authors assess the changes across these two important regions, outline the implications for U.S. security and specifically for the U.S. military, and offer policy recommendations for the way forward.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1925/thumbnail.jp

The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in the Pacific

View the Executive SummaryThe time has come for a reappraisal of the U.S. Army’s forward presence in East Asia, given the evolving strategic context and the extraordinarily high, recurring costs of deploying U.S. Army forces from the 50 states for increasingly important security cooperation activities across the Indo-Asia-Pacific theater. Without unduly harming America\u27s commitment to deterrence on the Korean peninsula, a reconfigured Army forward presence could help to achieve U.S. objectives throughout the theater more effectively through more regular, longer-duration engagement with critical allies and partners, while reducing the recurring transportation costs associated with today’s practice of sending U.S.-based units to conduct most exercises and training events across the Indo-Asia-Pacific region. Certainly, there are some major challenges involved in reconfiguring the Army\u27s forward presence, but these are not insurmountable. Furthermore, to avoid trying would severely limit the effectiveness and the efficiency of the Army’s contribution to broader U.S. national security goals.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1490/thumbnail.jp

Military Engagement and Forward Presence: Down but Not Out as Tools to Shape and Win

Military engagement and forward-based U.S. military forces offer decisionmakers effective and efficient mechanisms for maintaining American influence, deterring aggression, assuring allies, building tomorrow’s coalitions, managing the challenge of disorder in the security environment, mitigating the risk of a major interstate war, and facilitating U.S. and coalition operations should deterrence fail. Unfortunately, significant cuts to overseas permanent presence and continuing pockets of institutional bias against engagement as a force multiplier and readiness enhancer have combined to limit the leverage possible through these two policy tools. Instead, reliance on precision strike stand-off capabilities and a strategy of surging American military might from CONUS after a crisis has already started have become particularly attractive approaches for managing insecurity in a more resource-constrained environment. This approach is short-sighted politically and strategically. Relying on stand-off capabilities and so-called “surge readiness” – instead of placing greater emphasis on forward presence and, when employed selectively, military engagement – will ultimately result in reduced American influence with friends and adversaries alike, encourage adversaries to act hastily and aggressively, and have the effect of reducing, not expanding, options available to any President.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1426/thumbnail.jp

Rotational Deployments vs. Forward Stationing: How Can the Army Achieve Assurance and Deterrence Efficiently and Effectively?

The Army’s force posture is out of balance, with a greater percentage of troops stationed in the United States than at any time since the late 1940s. This has forced an over-reliance on lengthy, continuous rotational deployments to achieve deterrence and assurance in theaters such as northeast Asia and Europe. This finding is based on a 9-month study assessing the costs and benefits of rotational deployments and forward stationing. The analysis reveals that in terms of fiscal cost, training readiness, morale and family readiness, and diplomatic factors, the United States could likely achieve deterrence and assurance objectives more efficiently and more effectively with increased forward stationing. The recommendations address what kinds of units would be best suited for forward stationing, where forward stationing would be most efficacious, and how the Department of Defense should go about rebalancing Army force posture.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1407/thumbnail.jp

The Future of American Landpower: Does Forward Presence Still Matter? The Case of the Army in Europe

View the Executive SummaryIn this monograph, Dr. John R. Deni explores the utility of forward presence in Europe, placing the recent decisions—and, in particular, the arguments against forward presence—in the context of a decades-long tradition on the part of many political leaders, scholars, and others to mistakenly tie the forward-basing of U.S. forces to more equal defense burden sharing across the entire North Atlantic alliance. In assessing whether and how forward presence still matters in terms of protecting U.S. interests and achieving U.S. objectives, Dr. Deni bridges the gap between academics and practitioners by grounding his analysis in political science theory while illuminating how forward-basing yields direct, tangible benefits in terms of military operational interoperability. Moreover, Dr. Deni’s monograph forms a critical datapoint in the ongoing dialogue regarding the future of American Landpower, particular in this age of austerity.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1539/thumbnail.jp

The Real Rebalancing: American Diplomacy and the Tragedy of President Obama’s Foreign Policy

American security policy rests on a three-legged stool consisting of defense, diplomacy, and development. As President Obama implied in his May 2014 speech at West Point, the United States is in the midst of a resurgence of diplomacy and development, as it seeks to leverage diplomatic influence, foreign aid, and multilateral institutions to solve the most vexing international security challenges. However, the dramatic rebalance toward diplomacy and development over the last several years has largely has failed. Rhetoric, official strategies, and actual policies have all aimed at rebalancing the three legs of the foreign policy stool. However, several factors point to a continued militarization of U.S. foreign policy, including funding levels, legal authorities, and the growing body of evidence that civilian agencies of the U.S. Government lack the resources, skills, and capabilities to achieve foreign policy objectives. Continued reliance by senior decisionmakers at both ends of Pennsylvania Avenue on the U.S. military in the development, planning, and implementation of U.S. foreign policy has significant implications. Foremost among them is the fact that the military itself must prepare for a future not terribly unlike the very recent past.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1439/thumbnail.jp

Augmenting Our Influence: Alliance Revitalization and Partner Development

View the Executive SummaryAs the United States and its allies prepare to withdraw most of their military forces from Afghanistan and following the end of the war in Iraq, fundamental questions have arisen over the future of American Landpower. Among them are the role of allies and partners in terms of contributing to the safeguarding of shared global interests, the implications of the Pacific rebalancing for American alliances worldwide, and the role of Landpower in identifying, developing, and maintaining critical alliances, partnerships, and other relationships. To examine these and other questions, as well as to formulate potential solutions to the challenges facing U.S. national security in the coming decade, the U.S. Army War College gathered a panel of experts on alliances and partnerships for the 24th Annual Strategy Conference in Carlisle, PA. Conducted on April 9-11, 2013, the conference explored American Landpower implications associated with an evolving national security strategy. Chaired by the Strategic Studies Institute’s Dr. John R. Deni, the panel devoted to alliances and partnerships featured expert presentations based on the papers in this edited volume by Dr. Sean Kay, Dr. Carol Atkinson, and Dr. William Tow. Their analyses provided the U.S. Army and the U.S. Department of Defense with invaluable strategic assessments and insights.https://press.armywarcollege.edu/monographs/1502/thumbnail.jp